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In Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, the 
Fourth Circuit held that a foreign company with no U.S. 
federal trademark registration for "FLANAX" could 
nevertheless demand cancellation of its competitor's U.S. 
trademark for "FLANAX". This holding circumvented 
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, a provision which 
protects trademark owners in signatory countries by way of 
the well-known mark doctrine. Following Belmora's 
precedent would allow foreign trademark owners to bypass 
the U.S.'s existing trademark registration system and so 
undermine U.S. trademark law's central principle of 
territoriality. This Article argues that Article 6bis is critical 
to asserting substantive rights on behalf of foreign 
trademark owners in the U.S. Part I of this Article reviews 
the history and common criticisms behind the well-known 
mark doctrine. Part II balances the doctrine against 
trademark territoriality and applies its resulting theory to 
the Belmora decision. Part III reviews theories for reform 
and argues that where unfair competition law conflicts with 
a foundational trademark principle such as territoriality, 
trademark principles should triumph.  
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In 2016, the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff may have 
standing under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act even if it had not used its 
trademark in commerce within the United States.1 Belmora LLC v. 
Bayer Consumer Care AG thus opened an opportunity for foreign 
trademark owners to bypass the U.S.'s existing trademark system 
and its current registrants. Such decisions are not unprecedented.2 
However, Belmora did something unique: the court's reasoning 
circumvented Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, a provision 
which protects trademark owners in signatory countries. By creating 
case law for the 'famous' or 'well-known mark' doctrine that does not 
attach to Article 6bis, the decision came into tension with the 
territoriality principle at the heart of U.S. trademark law. 
 
I. THE WELL-KNOWN MARK DOCTRINE 
 
Under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, a foreign 
trademark's owner can petition the trademark offices in countries 
which have signed the treaty to refuse or to cancel the registration, 
and to prohibit the use of virtually any trademark which could be 
confused with the foreign trademark owner's well-known mark 
where that mark is being used for the sale of identical or similar 
goods.3 This is known colloquially as the 'famous' or 'well-known 
mark' doctrine.4 The U.S. signed onto the treaty in 1887 and has 
been a significant party to its revisions in subsequent years.5 In 
theory, Article 6bis thus grants exclusive protection within the U.S. 
to any trademark owned by a foreign national. This protection 
                                                                                                             
1 Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 2016).  
2 See infra Part I.B. 
3 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Art. 6bis, July 14, 
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter "Paris Convention"]. 
4 Courts and commentators have used the terms interchangeably; however, 
because the well-known mark doctrine differs from the 'famous mark’ 
necessary to prove cause for trademark dilution in the U.S., this Article 
confines its discussion to the term 'well-known mark’. 
5 See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The Trips Agreement and 
New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 1, 19 (2004). 
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applies even if the owner has not registered that mark with the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office or used it in the U.S., so long as its 
home country is a signatory to the Paris Convention.6 
 
A.  History 
 
1. Considerations During and After the Paris Convention  
 
Created in 1883, the Paris Convention aimed to create a baseline 
for international dealings in trademark and unfair competition.7 
Drafters at the convention focused on ensuring reciprocal treatment 
with regard to intellectual property rights for intellectual property 
owners in signatory countries, regardless of whether those owners 
had sought formal rights outside of their home countries.8 This 
priority grew into Article 6bis, which elides the user requirement 
within a given country for well-known marks and emphasizes 
instead factors such as source indication, the basis of the defendant's 
use, and the defendant's co-opting of goodwill.9 Although the U.S. 
has been a longstanding signatory, the extent to which the Paris 
Convention has had any substantive effect on U.S. trademark law is 
still an open question.10  
 
                                                                                                             
6 Certain reviewers have argued that Article 10bis of the Paris Convention—
which prohibits any act which serves to create trademark confusion, or 
otherwise mislead consumers regarding identical or similar goods—
deliberately reinforces Article 6bis’s effect. Treating unfair competition 
claims and trademark infringement claims as interchangeable, however, has 
confused the law over time. In an effort to distinguish the topic, examining the 
interoperability of Article 10bis within the well-known marks doctrine falls 
outside the scope of this Article. For discussion on the blur between unfair 
competition and trademark infringement, see infra Part II.C. 
7 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 19:74 (4th ed. 2005). 
8 Geri L. Haight & Philip Catanzano, The Effects of Global Priority of 
Trademark Rights, 91 MASS. L. REV. 18, 21 (2007). 
9 Paris Convention, supra note 2. 
10 See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 29:4, at 29–30 (4th ed. 2005) (claiming that Article 6bis has 
been incorporated into U.S. trademark canon via §§ 43(a), 43(b), and 44(h) of 
the Lanham Act); see also infra Part I.C.2. 
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The question endures in large part because of the Paris 
Convention's unclear status in the U.S. Since the Paris Convention 
is not a self-executing treaty, trademark owners can claim rights 
under the treaty only to the extent that its signatory countries 
espouse those rights in substantive legislation.11 Like many 
countries, however, U.S. trademark law has historically emphasized 
territoriality in both its common law decisions and in its statutes.12 
This principle holds that intellectual property rights are inherently 
national in character and any protections granted on the basis of such 
rights have limited extraterritorial reach.13 Faithful to the 
territoriality principle, courts have rarely extended U.S. trademark 
laws into foreign countries.14 Due to this lingering tension, the Paris 
Convention has had scattered and sporadic influence in the U.S.15 
 
2. The TRIPS Agreement and Influences on the Doctrine's 
Development 
 
Concerned that the Paris Convention provided insufficient 
protections for intellectual property owners, the U.S. negotiated and 
lobbied for the inclusion of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights into the Uruguay Round of 
                                                                                                             
11 See 7 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 24:1 (reviewing the origins and limitations 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including the Paris 
Convention). 
12 See, e.g.,15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2000). 
13 See, e.g., Pers.'s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) ("The concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law; trademark 
rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory 
scheme."). 
14 See Circuit Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (holding that 
Lanham Act claims extend into foreign countries only when the alleged 
infringer's conduct affects U.S. commerce and applicable foreign law does not 
explicitly preclude the application of U.S. law). Subsequent cases include 
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 743–44, 747 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(holding that not every activity of a foreign corporation with any tendency to 
create some confusion among American consumers could be prohibited by the 
extraterritorial reach of a U.S. injunction); First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. 
First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc., 476 F.3d 867 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Hilton Intern. 
Co., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 888 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
15 See infra Part II.B.1. 
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994.16 The TRIPS 
Agreement supplemented the protections granted to foreign 
trademarks in signatory countries under the Paris Convention by 
protecting service marks.17 It also extended a well-known trademark 
owner's rights to preventing uses of identical or similar trademarks 
for dissimilar goods or services, "provided that use of that trademark 
in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection 
between those goods or services and the owner of the registered 
trademark and provided that the interest of the owner of the 
registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use."18  
Seeking to address concerns on varying applications of the terms 
'reputation' and 'well-known' for well-known trademarks in 
signatory countries, the World Intellectual Property Organization 
("WIPO") bolstered the agreement in 1998 by way of a 'Joint 
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-
Known Marks'.19 This served as an advisory document for countries 
seeking guidelines on implementing the well-known marks 
doctrine. 
In application, however, the TRIPS Agreement has also had a 
limited impact on U.S. trademark canon. Language within the 
agreement itself indicates that members must "give effect to the 
provisions of this Agreement" for the treaty to hold sway, and are 
"free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the 
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and 
practice."20 Federal law further provides that U.S. statutes must 
triumph where any such laws prove inconsistent with the TRIPS 
                                                                                                             
16 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 
175–6 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
17 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, Art. 16(2) 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS or TRIPS Agreement] ("Article 6bis of 
the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to services."). 
18 TRIPS, Art. 16(3). 
19 World Intellectual Property Organization, Joint Recommendation 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well–Known Marks (Sept. 
1999), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/833/pub833.pdf/. 
20 TRIPS, Art. 1(1). 
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agreement.21 Thus, courts have uniformly held that the agreement is 
not, in itself, a self-executing treaty with the force of law.22 
B.  Current Doctrinal Application in the U.S. 
As a result, the U.S.'s application of the well-known marks 
doctrine has proven unwieldy and controversial. Courts generally 
agree on the doctrine's definition—namely that owners of well-
known trademarks in foreign countries may theoretically prohibit 
the use of identical or similar-looking marks in the U.S. by way of 
a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act, even where 
the foreign mark's owner has not registered the mark or used the 
mark in U.S. commerce.23 However, the bases by which a foreign 
trademark owner may claim such rights vary wildly between 
jurisdictions.24 Before Belmora, two perspectives reigned.25 The 
first view held that Article 6bis of the Paris Convention had been 
effectively integrated into existing trademark legislation through § 
44(b) of the Lanham Act, which provides that a foreign national 
whose country of origin is a party "to any convention relating to 
trademarks… or the repression of unfair competition, to which the 
United States is also a party"26 is entitled to all benefits arising from 
                                                                                                             
21 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) ("No provision of any of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements [including the TRIPS Agreement], nor the application of any such 
provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of 
the United States shall have effect."). 
22 See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161 (2d Cir. 2007) 
("TRIPS is plainly not a self-executing treaty. . . ."); In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 
1209 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (". . . we find that the Paris Convention is not a self-
executing treaty."). 
23 See generally American Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon Breakers, Inc., 
406 F.3d 577, 581–83 (9th Cir. 2005); Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 
F.3d 700, 714 (3d Cir. 2004); Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
24 See, e.g., Grupo Gigante II, 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 
2004); Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 
326–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
25 See Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don't I Know You from Somewhere? Protection 
in the United States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known but Not 
Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1396 (2008). 
26 15 U.S.C § 1126.  
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the Lanham Act.27 The second view held that, because no U.S. 
federal trademark legislation existed to codify the Paris Convention 
or the TRIPS Agreement, neither agreement had been formally 
executed and could not be construed as law.28 Over time, these views 
consolidated into the primary rallying points for proponents and 
opponents of the argument that the well-known mark doctrine was 
an exception to the territoriality principle underlying U.S. trademark 
law. 
 
1. Ninth Circuit Requirements  
 
In Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co.,29 the Ninth 
Circuit explicitly exempted the well-known marks doctrine from the 
territoriality principle underlying U.S. trademark law. In 2004, a 
Mexican grocery chain sued a grocery store in California, claiming 
trademark infringement of its trademark 'Gigante'. While it had not 
registered the 'Gigante' mark in the U.S., the plaintiff argued that its 
mark was well-known and so entitled to protection under the 
Lanham Act by way of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.30 The 
Grupo court held that Article 6bis provided a substantive right for 
foreign trademark owners enforceable through § 44 of the Lanham 
Act.31 Affirming the district court in its exemption, the Ninth Circuit 
justified the doctrine as merely "recognizing the realities of modern 
society and business by acknowledging the fact that a trademark can 
be carried to areas far from the actual point of sale due to advertising 
and the ambulatory nature of consumers."32 
Recognizing the doctrine's potential conflicts with territoriality, 
however, the Grupo court imposed specific limits on well-known 
trademark claims. In particular, the Ninth Circuit determined that 
significant factors included  
[whether] a substantial percentage of consumers in 
the relevant American market is familiar with the 
                                                                                                             
27 See infra Part I.B.1.  
28 See infra Part I.B.2. 
29 Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). 
30 Id. at 1098. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 1090. 
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foreign mark[,] . . . the geographic area where the 
defendant uses the alleged infringing mark[,] . . . the 
intentional copying of the mark by the defendant, and 
whether customers of the American firm are likely to 
think they are patronizing the same firm that uses the 
mark in another country.33  
Finding such factors need not be considered dispositive, the court 
held. Rather, the relevant inquiry should be directed towards factors 
which "bear heavily on the risks of consumer confusion and fraud," 
and which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.34 
Commentators have noted the decision's lack of precedent and 
the test's openness to judicial manipulation.35 By failing to establish 
grounds in which to root Grupo's precedent, and by refusing to 
establish concrete standards by which to define a well-known mark, 
critics have argued that the well-known mark doctrine provides an 
opening to weaken the territoriality principle significantly. 
 
2. Rejection of the Doctrine in the Second Circuit 
 
Not three years after Grupo, the opposite pole to the well-known 
marks doctrine grew from the Second Circuit. In ITC Ltd. v. 
Punchgini, Inc.,36 the court determined that no legislative basis 
existed to insert the well-known marks doctrine into the Lanham 
Act. In ITC Ltd., restaurant owners operating in Southeastern Asia 
under the trademark BUKHARA sued former employees who had 
opened two restaurants in New York City under the trademark 
BUKHARA GRILL. Arguing that the defendants had deliberately 
mimicked the plaintiffs' allegedly internationally renowned 
                                                                                                             
33 Id. at 1098. 
34 Id. 
35 See generally Kristin Zobel, The Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should 
Well-Known Foreign Marks Receive Trademark Protection Within the United 
States?, 19 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 145 (2008); James 
Faris, The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle in 
American Trademark Law, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 451 (2009); Rachel 
Brook, The United States' Adoption of the Well-Known Foreign Mark 
Exception, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889 (2009). 
36 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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marks37—which included logos, decor, staff uniforms, wood-slab 
menus, and red-checkered customer bibs38—the plaintiffs sued for 
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising in 
violation of the Lanham Act.39  
The Second Circuit, however, held that it could not discern in 
the relevant portions of the Lanham Act "a clear congressional intent 
to incorporate a famous marks exception into federal unfair 
competition law."40 To carve out an exception for marks of 
international renown in U.S. law was Congressional territory. 
Arguments based on policy, the court asserted, "must be submitted 
to Congress for it to determine whether and under what 
circumstances to accord federal recognition to such an exception to 
the basic principle of territoriality."41 But the foreign plaintiffs were 
not left entirely without recourse: in a later opinion, the court held 
that the plaintiffs were eligible to file a misappropriation claim 
under New York state law, provided that they could prove secondary 
meaning.42 Ultimately, the Second Circuit demurred from 
incorporating the Paris Convention into existing federal trademark 
canon. 
In the seven years following, the ITC and Grupo decisions 
effectively dichotomized the tensions underlying the U.S. approach 
to the well-known mark doctrine: courts could either seek to 
incorporate Article 6bis into trademark canon or stand by the Paris 
Convention's non-self-executing nature.43 
C.  Contemporary Criticisms 
Due in large part to the doctrine's bipolarity, items key to the 
well-known marks doctrine have often been left to judicial 
                                                                                                             
37 Id. at 143. 
38 Id. at 144. 
39 Id. at 142. 
40 Id. at 163. 
41 Id. at 165. 
42 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2007). 
43 See, e.g., Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo 
S.A. De C.V., 69 F. Supp. 3d 175 (D.D.C. 2014); Kerzner Int'l Ltd. v. Monarch 
Casino & Resort, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D. Nev. 2009); Aktieselskabet 
AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007 
[hereinafter Well-Known Mark Doctrine Cases]).  
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discretion. Courts have ranged in their definitions of terms, from 
what may constitute a "well-known mark" to the factors necessary 
for a finding of trademark infringement, much to the doctrine's 
detriment. 
 
1. Judicial Vagueness in Defining and Evaluating a "Well-Known" 
Mark 
 
In the decades since the well-known marks doctrine reached the 
U.S., standards for key terms such as 'well-known' have remained 
unclear.44 This confusion originated in part from a failure to 
uniformly confirm or condemn the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris 
Convention as treaties which have, or lack, the force of law in the 
U.S.45 The Paris Convention provided few requirements, holding 
only that Article 6bis was expected 
to prohibit the use of a trademark which constitutes a 
reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to 
create confusion, of a mark considered by the 
competent authority of the country of registration or 
use to be well known in that country as being already 
the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this 
Convention and used for identical or similar goods.46  
As a result, circuits vary not only in their definitions of the term, but 
in whether judges even reference the factors provided by way of 
WIPO's joint recommendations.47 
Part of this confusion also appears etymological. Though the two 
doctrines apply to distinct forms of trademark harm, courts have not 
yet settled on how much, if at all, the 'well-known mark' overlaps 
with the 'famous mark' whose owner may sue for trademark dilution. 
Grupo imposes only two requirements, both of which suggest a use 
requirement typical for a trademark infringement claim.48 Compare 
                                                                                                             
44 See generally 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:4 (4th ed.). 
45 Id. 
46 Paris Convention, Art. 6bis.  
47 See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2007). 
48 Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 
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these requirements with earlier cases, which were often brought 
under a cloud of unfair competition claims. In Maison Prunier v. 
Prunier's Restaurant & Café,49 the court held that protections for the 
senior user's mark reached the territory where it had established a 
reputation, regardless of whether it had actually used or failed to use 
the mark in that territory. The court focused primarily on the 
American defendant's bad faith intent to take advantage of the senior 
user's reputation in France.50 The mere assertion that the plaintiff 
had "a well-known reputation and good will built up as the result of 
decades of honest business effort" was sufficient to entitle it to 
consideration as a well-known mark owner.51 Instead, the court's 
focus steered towards the broader precepts of unfair competition.52 
This contrasts, not only the non-exhaustive list of factors presented 
in Grupo, but also the many well-known mark factors that WIPO 
has put forward for consideration.53 
Subsequent courts have prioritized public policy over 
established factors in evaluating the well-known marks doctrine, 
depending on whether the substance of the claims seems to emerge 
from unfair competition or trademark infringement law.54 
Problematically, courts do not always distinguish between well-
known mark precedents drawn from unfair competition claims and 
those drawn from trademark infringement. Courts have thus varied 
in their willingness to prioritize specific factors in finding a well-
known mark, let alone whether the doctrine has any bearing in their 
circuit, based on a jumble of considerations between bodies of law.55 
                                                                                                             
2004). 
49 Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Café, 288 N.Y.S. 529 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1936). 
50 Id. at 537. 
51 Id. at 531. 
52 Id. at 532. 
53 World Intellectual Property Organization, Joint Recommendation 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well–Known Marks (Sept. 1999), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/833/pub833.pdf/. 
54 See Well-Known Mark Doctrine Cases, supra note 43; for general 
discussion of the interplay between the Paris Convention and unfair 
competition law, see Patricia V. Norton, The Effect of Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention on American Unfair Competition Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 
(1999). 
55 See Well-Known Mark Doctrine Cases, supra note 43. 
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The uncertainty of the doctrine's definition has thus crippled its 
growth and applicability. 
 
2. Lack of Use Requirement 
 
In a striking departure from general trademark tenets, U.S. 
courts have failed to require any showing of use from the well-
known mark doctrine.56 Subsequent courts have typically looked to 
Grupo as the primary implementation of the well-known mark 
doctrine in the U.S.57 Grupo, however, set out only two 
requirements: (1) that a preponderance of the evidence must show 
that a substantial percentage of relevant American consumers were 
aware of the mark, and (2) that these consumers must be in the 
disputed area.58 Thus, Grupo's language elides the presumed notice 
critical to establishing the rights of unregistered marks. 
Efforts to bridge the discrepancy between the well-known mark 
doctrine and standard U.S. trademark canon have varied. Some 
academics have read the doctrine to expand on trademark dilution 
and to evaluate the suit based on whether the defendant's use of the 
mark impacts the reputation of the plaintiff's goods or services.59 
Under the Dilution Act, the plaintiff need not prove a likelihood of 
confusion or that the defendant sought to compete with the plaintiff's 
goods or services.60 Instead, the plaintiff must only demonstrate that 
the defendant's use of a mark weakened the connection between the 
plaintiff's mark and the plaintiff's goods or services in the relevant 
                                                                                                             
56 See Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don't I Know You from Somewhere? Protection 
in the United States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known but Not 
Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379 (2008). 
57 See Well-Known Mark Doctrine supra note 43. 
58 Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
59 Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The Other Famous Marks Doctrine, 17 TRANSNAT'L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 757 (2008)). 
60 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25 cmt. b. (1995) ("[T]he 
state of mind required for confusion and dilution are distinct and inconsistent. 
Confused consumers believe that the actor's use of the mark indicates a 
connection with the trademark owner, and thus for those consumers the actor's 
use does not dilute the distinctiveness of the mark."). 
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geographic market,61 or that the defendant's use of the mark causes 
an unsavory or inferior reflection upon the plaintiff's products.62 
Such a reading, however, strays from the doctrine's intended effects 
under Article 6bis. A dilution suit in the U.S. requires that the mark 
at issue must be "widely recognized by the general consuming 
public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods 
or services of the mark's owner."63 Notably, recognition seems 
unlikely within the U.S. without either use or actual registration.64 
 
3. New Zone-of-Interests Requirement  
 
Over time, even standing has become an issue in applying the 
doctrine. In 2014, the Supreme Court adopted a 'zone-of-interests' 
test in determining who may bring a claim for false advertising.65 
Distilled, Lexmark v. Static Control Components, Inc. requires that 
courts evaluate whether a claimant falls within the zone-of-
interests—better known as the class of plaintiffs authorized to sue 
under § 1125(a)—based on two considerations: (i) whether the 
plaintiff is seeking to protect interests that the statute was designed 
to redress, and (ii) whether a plaintiff can successfully plead, and 
subsequently prove, an injury to a commercial interest in sales or 
business reputation proximately caused by the defendant's 
misrepresentations.66 The Lexmark court intended these as factors 
for determining 'statutory' standing rather than 'prudential' 
standing,67 and the test was meant to be "not especially 
demanding."68 Lexmark thus departed significantly from previous 
standing rules for false advertising claims, which had developed a 
                                                                                                             
61 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
62 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
63 Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don't I Know You from Somewhere? Protection in 
the United States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known but Not Used 
There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1396 (2008). 
64 Id. 
65 Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 
(2014). 
66 Id. at 1391–2. 
67 Id. at 1386. 
68 Id. at 1389. 
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reputation for stringency.69 
However, by expanding standing for trademark infringement 
suits to incorporate protection from unfair competition, specifically 
"injuries to business reputation and present and future sales," the 
Lexmark Court created a target all too easy for foreign marks to 
reach.70 Under American trademark canon, almost any case where a 
defendant's foreign conduct confuses American consumers will 
likely have a substantial effect on U.S. commerce.71 Indeed, courts 
have traditionally weighed American consumer confusion more 
significantly than other factors in findings of foreign trademark 
infringement.72 Although relaxing the standard for false advertising 
claims expands the class of permissible plaintiffs, Lexmark acted too 
generously in granting standing to a doctrine which has yet to 
establish the boundaries of its key terms and requirements. 
Traditional statutory standing under the Lanham Act has been 
expected to further the Act's specific purpose: preventing consumer 
confusion and preserving producer goodwill.73 While Lexmark 
benefited consumers by shifting the focus onto the harm suffered by 
plaintiffs, the decision offers no barrier to foreign trademark owners 
seeking to take advantage of the well-known trademark doctrine. 
                                                                                                             
69 Deborah R. Gerhardt, Lexmark and the Death of Initial Interest Confusion, 
7 LANDSLIDE 22, 25 (2014) ("Standing rules for false advertising claims had 
been viewed as notoriously stringent."). 
70 Id. (discussing the Lexmark court’s recognition of the false advertising 
statute’s purpose as protection from unfair competition and lack of basis for 
applying the test any differently to trademark infringement litigation). 
71 See, e.g., United Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); see also 
Fun–Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1006 (2d Cir. 
1997) (importing infringing products "clearly has substantial impact on United 
States commerce"). 
72 See, e.g., Rodgers v. Wright, 544 F. Supp. 2d 302, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(holding that the Lanham Act applies to an American defendant's foreign 
infringement where that infringement resulted in a likelihood of a confusion 
to American consumers); see also Piccoli A/S v. Calvin Klein Jeanswear Co., 
19 F. Supp. 2d 157, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (emphasizing a substantial effect 
on U.S. commerce where a defendant's conduct results in consumer 
confusion). 
73 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:1 (4th ed.). 
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D.  A comparison in doctrinal expectations 
The U.S.'s failure to sustain a coherent body of case law for the 
well-known mark is not unique;74 nevertheless, it provides a striking 
contrast to the doctrine's development elsewhere. Through the 
European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), Paris Convention signatories in 
Europe have established both the grounds by which a claimant may 
raise the doctrine as well as the factors which define a 'well-known 
mark'.75 While the well-known mark doctrine in Europe took root 
for different reasons than it did in the U.S., 76 the two nevertheless 
yield instructive parallels. Citizens of Europe, for example, are more 
likely to travel from country to country than their American 
counterparts.77 Packaging of a single product often varies 
significantly from country to country, even those which border one 
another.78 As such, consumers accustomed to receiving products 
from a variety of countries must rely less on the packaging of a given 
product and more on the source-identifying function of a trademark. 
Filing for a trademark in every country of the European Union, 
however, is far more expensive than filing for a federal trademark 
to cover a similar expanse of territory in the U.S.79 The well-known 
mark doctrine thus enables European companies to exclude others 
from using their marks for a given good or service where such 
companies can prove that the mark has a strong likelihood of 
                                                                                                             
74 See Stephanie M. Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China: 
Challenges for Foreign Mark Holders, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 371 (2008). 
75 See infra Part I.D.1. 
76 See infra Part III.A.1.  
77 HostelWorld, Introducing the Hostelworld Meet The World Report… (last 
visited May 23, 2017), available at 
http://www.hostelworld.com/blog/introducing-hostelworld-meet-world-
report/. 
78 Mary LaFrance, A Material World: Using Trademark Law to Override 
Copyright's First Sale Rule for Imported Copies, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 43, 72–3 (2014) ("Goods manufactured or packaged 
specifically for foreign markets might have different ingredients, might be 
labeled or packaged differently, might be accompanied by different 
documentation (perhaps in a language other than English), might have been 
subjected to different levels of quality control during manufacturing, 
packaging, handling, or shipping, and might be covered by different 
warranties."). 
79 See 1 TRADEMARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 54:2. 
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confusing consumers in a specific geographic region, even without 
registration. Such a right recalls the common law use doctrine in the 
U.S. However, the E.U. showcases a tendency to mix unfair 
competition precedents into trademark-based claims, based on 
specific directives and tenets unfeasible under U.S. trademark 
canon. 
 
1. Defining Case Law in the E.U. 
 
Cases such as General Motors Corp v. Yplon SA established the 
boundaries and factors to consider in evaluating a trademark's 
reputation, particularly the market share held by the earlier mark. In 
General Motors Corp. v. Yplon SA, both General Motors and Yplon 
had registered the word mark CHEVY at the Benelux Trademark 
Office: General Motors for motor vehicles in 1971 and Yplon for 
cleaning products. General Motors sought an injunction 
against Yplon's use of the mark under the Trademark Directive, 
which protected well-known trademarks from dilution.80 In 
determining General Motors' rights, the European Court of Justice 
specifically addressed two questions: "1) How is the concept of a 
trademark with a reputation within the meaning of Article 5(2) of 
the Directive to be interpreted?; 2) Must the reputation of the 
trademark extend throughout the three Benelux countries or is it 
sufficient that its reputation is established in one of those countries 
or part thereof?"81 The court subsequently compared the defining 
characteristics of a mark with a reputation to those of a well-known 
trademark, and ultimately held that "a mark with a reputation need 
not be as well-known as a well-known mark."82 Instead, the ECJ 
held that a mark with a reputation must satisfy two conditions: "it 
must be known to a large part of the public concerned by the two 
products in question … [and] the earlier mark must have a reputation 
such that the consumer, on seeing the contested mark, associates the 
latter with the earlier mark and makes a connection between the 
                                                                                                             
80 Case C-375/97, General Motors Corp. v. Yplon, S.A., [1999] E.C.R. I-
5421, [1999] E.T.M.R. 122. 
81 Id. at ¶ 17. 
82 Id. at ¶ 37. 
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two."83 
Significantly, the ECJ's ruling refers back to Article 5 of the 
Trademark Directive, which allows suit based on use of a trademark 
which "takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive 
character or the repute of the trade mark."84 Later courts have only 
expanded upon this right, holding that member states may allow 
trademark owners to prevent third parties from using the sign for 
dissimilar goods, even though no likelihood of confusion exists.85 
As such, the Directive currently provides for three different levels 
of protection in member states: (1) protections afforded to trademark 
owners for marks related to goods or services which are identical to 
those for which the mark is registered; (2) protections for trademark 
users against marks which are identical or similar to registered 
marks and likely to cause confusion on the part of the public; and 
(3) protections for trademark users against marks identical or similar 
to well-known marks, registered or otherwise. 
The E.U.'s blend of unfair competition and trademark law, 
however, has taken trademark law's ability to police unfair 
competition to an extreme. In L'Oréal v. Bellure,86 L'Oréal took 
legal action for trademark infringement against Bellure after Bellure 
manufactured and marketed a line of 'smell-alike' perfumes modeled 
on the more famous L'Oréal products with explicit, continuous 
comparisons to the L'Oréal brand perfumes. Although Bellure never 
sought to pass off its products as those of L'Oréal, L'Oréal 
nevertheless filed suit with both trademark infringement and unfair 
competition claims, arguing that that Bellure had infringed their 
registered word-marks and that Bellure had used their marks to 
attain an unfair advantage in the market.87 Upon referral to the ECJ, 
the court held that the Trademark Directive did not require 
likelihood of confusion or detriment to the trademark owner's 
                                                                                                             
83 Id. at ¶ 38. 
84 Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld Training LTD, 2003 
E.C.R. 0000, 2003 WL 101343. 
85 See, e.g., Case C-418/02, Praktiker Bau v. Heimwerkermarkte AG, 2005 
E.C.R. I-05873; Case C-421/04, Matratzen Concord AG v. Hukla Germany 
SA, 2006 E.C.R. 1-02303; Mastercard International Incorporated v. Hitachi 
Credit (Uk) Plc ChD (Bailii, [2004] EWHC 1623 (Ch)). 
86 Case C-487/07, L'Oréal v. Bellure, 2009 E.C.R. I-05185. 
87 Id. ¶ 12. 
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business. Rather, the 'unfair advantage' derives from the third-party 
user's "riding on the coat-tails" of the senior mark in order to benefit 
from the senior mark's reputation and existing goodwill "without 
paying any financial compensation."88 Provided that use of the 
junior mark either affected, or was liable to affect, one of the other 
major functions of the senior mark, a court could find an unfair 
advantage and could subsequently bar use of the junior mark. 
The decision troubled U.S. commentators in large part because 
the case turned on "vague and undefined notions of unfair 
competition and free riding."89 Where U.S. law focuses on the harm 
suffered by the senior mark user,90 the concept of "taking unfair 
advantage"91 shifts the court's attention instead to the benefits 
received by the junior mark user. This hostility to free-riding, critics 
have argued, goes against the economic purpose of U.S. trademark 
law: its vagueness significantly impairs comparative advertising and 
chills the possibility of smaller competitors entering a market 
already dominated by a trademark user with an established 
reputation.92 
Taken together, General Motors and its successors provide three 
vital distinctions between E.U. trademark law and U.S. canon. First, 
the Trademark Directive codifies references to unfair competition 
claims, which enables trademark owners to bring dilution suits 
based on misappropriation of goodwill.93 Second, the Directive does 
not require likelihood of confusion requirement from suits brought 
on behalf of a well-known mark. In such cases, the question 
becomes whether the relevant section of the public has heard of the 
mark rather than whether the junior mark would confuse them. 
Third, the qualifications to become a well-known mark in the E.U. 
                                                                                                             
88 Id. ¶ 49. 
89 See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and 
United States Law, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1163, 1165 (2004). 
90 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
91 L’Oréal, ¶¶ 41, 49. 
92 See generally Tim W. Dornis & Thomas Wein, Trademarks, Comparative 
Advertising, and Product Imitations: An Untold Story of Law and Economics, 
121 PENN ST. L. REV. 421 (2016). 
93 See Marcus H. H. Luepke, Taking Unfair Advantage or Diluting A 
Famous Mark - A 20/20 Perspective on the Blurred Differences Between 
U.S. and E.U. Dilution Law, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 789 (2008). 
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are not nearly as stringent as those of the U.S. The Lanham Act 
mandates that only nationally famous marks can raise anti-dilution 
claims—specifically, those marks that are "widely recognized by the 
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of 
source of the goods or services of the mark's owner."94 By contrast, 
marks seeking protection under the E.U.'s anti-dilution laws may 
still receive all the benefits of a famous mark, provided that it carries 
some reputation in a substantial portion of the relevant market 
sector. This, however, may have a significant chilling effect on its 
competition, at odds with the U.S. pro-competition spirit.  
 
II. BELMORA LLC V. BAYER CONSUMER CARE AG 
 
In Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, the Fourth Circuit 
held that a foreign company, which had neither used nor registered 
"FLANAX" in the U.S., could nevertheless demand cancellation of 
its competitor's "FLANAX" U.S. trademark registration. In 
Belmora, the plaintiff sold pain relievers under the "FLANAX" 
mark in Mexico and other parts of Latin America since the 1970s, 
but never in the U.S.95 In 2004, the defendant, which owned the 
FLANAX trademark in the U.S., used it to sell its own pain 
relievers. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the defendant, 
contending that Belmora had deliberately "used the FLANAX mark 
to… deceive Mexican–American consumers into thinking they were 
purchasing [the plaintiff's] product,"96 and alleged that the plaintiff 
had been injured by this "false association with its FLANAX 
product in violation of Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A)."97  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that foreign marks which had 
been neither registered nor used in U.S. commerce could 
nevertheless find protection under the Lanham Act. Because the 
plaintiff had abandoned its Article 6bis claims on appeal, the court 
fell back instead to the premise that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act had 
become a shelter for unfair competition as well as trademark 
                                                                                                             
94 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
95 Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 
2016). 




Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol12/iss4/4
2017] TAKING CARE OF ARTICLE 6BISNESS 521 
 
 
infringement claims.98 As a result, the court's reasoning necessarily 
deviated from precedent raised in either the Second or the Ninth 
Circuits. Specifically, the court emphasized that "this is an unfair 
competition case, not a trademark infringement case."99 Holding 
that Congress had deliberately omitted any requirement that a 
plaintiff use its own mark in U.S. commerce in order to have 
standing to sue under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,100 the Belmora 
court determined that the plaintiff's case could be read as a series of 
unfair competition claims, and could accordingly be judged only on 
the merits of those claims. Most significant among the Belmora 
Court's rulings are its determinations that use in U.S. commerce had 
never been an express prerequisite to bringing a § 43(a) action,101 
and that the well-known mark doctrine entrenches the very core of 
American trademark law: preventing consumer confusion and 
preserving the goodwill of the manufacturer.102 
 
A.  Territoriality in U.S. Trademark Law 
 
Under the territoriality principle, trademark registration 
represents the government's recognition of an individual's right to a 
specific brand within the country.103 By definition, trademarks act 
as source-indicators and as tools to compile goodwill towards the 
owner's specific goods or services.104 Thus, a trademark is useful 
only so long as the owner can exclude others from use of that mark 
for purposes of marketing particular goods or services.105 
Exclusivity serves both the mark-owner and the consuming public: 
                                                                                                             
98 Id. at 710. 
99 Id. at 708. 
100 Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 708 (4th Cir. 
2016). 
101 Id. at 706. 
102 Id. at 714. 
103 See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 
591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Ingenohl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 
541, 544 (1927) ("... the territoriality principle is one that is "basic to trademark 
law," in which trademark rights "exist in each country solely according to that 
country's statutory scheme.")). 
104 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:1 (4th ed.). 
105 See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) (first case in the U.S. 
to reject the "universality" theory of trademarks in favor of territoriality). 
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by registering a trademark, the owner has incentive to perpetuate the 
mark's reputation by streamlining product quality. Further, the 
public knows to rely on the mark for products of established quality. 
Because a national government can only exercise control within its 
country borders, academics and courts alike have generally held that 
trademarks rely on territoriality as a matter of common sense. 
Nevertheless, the territoriality principle serves a narrower 
purpose than the unfair competition principles which formed the 
trademark system. As a result, parts of trademark law seem to 
oppose one another where territoriality conflicts with the larger 
precepts of unfair competition law. Comparing the treatment of the 
common law trademark doctrine with that of the well-known mark 
doctrine makes this particularly clear. Both operate under the 
presumption that marks deserve certain rights based on the 
likelihood of consumer confusion. Territoriality, however, 
emphasizes the geographic scope of use as well as the likelihood of 
confusion; thus common law marks have established rights without 
registration, while the rights of registered foreign marks are 
conditional. 
Other jurisdictions have avoided this question entirely by 
protecting unregistered marks exclusively under unfair competition 
law: the E.U., for example, holds that a passing-off plaintiff must 
show misrepresentation, damages, and loss of goodwill in order to 
succeed in a passing-off suit.106 By extending protection to 
unregistered marks, the government imposes a double-qualification: 
trademarks may receive protection based not only on government 
acknowledgement, but on any use which may result in consumer 
confusion. Thus, while courts have claimed that "foreign use is 
ineffectual to create trademark rights in the United States,"107 
foreign use is not irreconcilable with ongoing U.S. trademark canon. 
Owners of foreign trademarks have largely used two legal theories. 
First, they may claim priority rights based on use of the mark in the 
U.S. in compliance with the territoriality principle.108 Second, they 
                                                                                                             
106 See Erven Warnink B.V. v. J. Townsend & Sons (Hull) Ltd., [1979] A.C. 
731 (H.L.). 
107 La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 
1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1974). 
108 See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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may seek exemption from the territoriality principle and claim a 
similar priority right based on likelihood of confusion based on the 
broader principles of false advertising and unfair competition law.109 
Arguments against exempting foreign use from the territoriality 
principle have traditionally been directed towards two items: first, a 
refusal to overextend the Lanham Act;110 second, concerns 
regarding foreign retribution, which could weaken the trademarks 
of American companies abroad.111 Where a U.S. national acts 
abroad, for instance, courts have had fewer qualms in extending the 
Lanham Act's reach.112 
 
B.  How the Territoriality Principle Weakens the Belmora Decision 
 
Faced with judicial vagueness on doctrinal definitions and 
requirements, Belmora inevitably drew controversy when it tried to 
circumvent the Paris Convention's lingering open question. The 
Fourth Circuit essentially rooted its acknowledgement of the well-
known mark doctrine in the premise that § 43(a) has become 
understood as a shelter for unfair competition claims as well as 
trademark infringement claims.113 As a result, the court dismissed 
previous holdings which treated use of the mark at issue within the 
U.S. as a prerequisite, determining that this had been imposed as an 
extraneous condition upon the statute.114 This reading comports with 
unfair competition law. Unlike trademark infringement, unfair 
                                                                                                             
109 See, e.g., De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, 
Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
110 See supra Part I.B.2. 
111 See Robert C. Bird & Elizabeth Brown, The Protection of Well-Known 
Foreign Marks in the United States: Potential Global Responses to Domestic 
Ambivalence, 38 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (2012). 
112 See United Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (American 
company had a right to enjoin Mexican businesses from using its trademark in 
Mexico); see also Int'l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Café Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 
F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 
633 (2d Cir. 1956). 
113 Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 710 (4th Cir. 
2016).  
114 Id. at 706 ("… the plain language of § 43(a) does not require that a plaintiff 
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competition claims typically need only show that the work at issue 
originated with the plaintiff, that the defendant falsely designated 
the work's origin, that the false designation was likely to cause 
consumer confusion, and that the plaintiff was harmed by the 
defendant's false designation.115 In theory, unfair competition 
precepts thus demand an exception to the territoriality principle in 
U.S. trademark canon for foreign trademark owners. 
However, Belmora misses the counterpoint between unfair 
competition and trademark infringement claims: namely, while the 
two have historically been intertwined, unfair competition has 
historically reflected broader priorities. Where its priorities aligned 
with those of trademark law, this caused no discrepancy. 
Territoriality's nation-specific focus, however, lies directly at odds 
with unfair competition's potentially global application, and 
subsequently with the well-known marks doctrine. 
Wholly avoiding the territoriality principle in the Belmora 
tradition is impractical. Territoriality traditionally exists to protect 
domestic goodwill. Commentators have made arguments regarding 
the impact of reputational feedback, market allocation, and free-
riding,116 but these de-emphasize if not disregard consumer 
confusion as the heart of trademark infringement. As the Ninth 
Circuit noted in Grupo, an absolute territoriality rule without a well-
known mark carve-out could well "promote consumer confusion 
and fraud" by enabling businesses within the company to ride on the 
coattails of successful foreign businesses.117 Taking Belmora to its 
logical end thus suggests that any trademark applicant could register 
a mark in a foreign trademark office and subsequently prevent the 
registration of similar marks in the U.S. without ever resorting to the 
Trademark Office.  
 
                                                                                                             
115 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
116 See Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of Harm, 
95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 117 (2009) ("At a more conceptual level, this literature 
suggests that if producer interests are to continue to influence the scope of 
trademark protection, courts must confront squarely market preemption and 
free-riding arguments, since those arguments have much more empirical 
support than the reputational feedback arguments."). 
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C.  Pre-Belmora Use of Unfair Competition Precedents  
 
Courts have long applied elements of both trademark and unfair 
competition law in establishing the well-known mark doctrine.118 
This unstable compromise is becoming increasingly untenable as the 
U.S. trademark regime interacts with the demands of an 
international market. Unfair competition law has only come to 
encompass additional claims over time; it is impractical, if not 
impossible, to interpret a doctrine which depends on a specific 
national regime according to the international precepts of its 
ancestral field of law. Where unfair competition law conflicts with 
a foundational trademark principle such as territoriality, trademark 
principles should triumph. 
Reconciling the disparate parts of the well-known mark doctrine 
has become particularly urgent after Belmora. Past courts looked to 
the precedents put forward by the Second and Ninth Circuits, and 
made their selections based at least in part on whether they 
acknowledged Article 6bis as having been incorporated by way of § 
44(b) of the Lanham Act, or whether they foresaw a need for 
congressional intervention.119 By introducing a new alternative, the 
Belmora court showcased an increasing judicial consciousness of 
the global environment. But this consciousness must be reined in 
with a uniform application of the doctrine.  
 
1. The Complexities of Overlapping Unfair Competition Claims 
with Trademark Infringement Claims 
 
The fields of unfair competition and trademark infringement 
have historically shared driving precepts, and so methods of 
application. Like trademark infringement, unfair competition law 
turned on the principle of passing off,120 which "afford[ed] relief 
wherever, by reason of an unjustifiable act, the goods of one party 
to the suit [would] probably be accepted by the purchasing public as 
                                                                                                             
118 See supra Part I.C. 
119 See Well-Known Mark Doctrine, supra note 43 
120 1 L. ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & 
MONOPOLIES (4th ed.) § 2.2. 
 
25
Wei: Taking Care of Article 6<i>bis</i>ness: How <i>Belmora LLC v. Bay
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2017
526       WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS     [VOL. 12:4 
the goods of another."121 As trade took on an international 
perspective, courts came to cite unfair competition as "the umbrella 
for all statutory and non-statutory causes of action arising out of 
business conduct that is contrary to honest practice in industrial and 
commercial matters."122 Such an umbrella includes cases such as 
"misappropriation of the right of publicity and other business values, 
false advertising and other false representations, and 
misappropriation of trade secrets."123 Since inception, these suits 
have historically sought to prevent the wrongful diversion of a 
plaintiff's business.124 
Thus, unfair competition law does more than yield a background 
to trademark infringement law. The field continues to absorb many 
of trademark infringement's tenets.125 Both trademark and unfair 
competition law exist to protect the reputation and goodwill of a 
mark as much as it does consumers from deception and confusion 
over the source of goods and services.126 Both trademark 
                                                                                                             
121 Wm. A. Rogers, Limited, v. Majestic Products Corporation, 23 F.2d 219, 
220 (D. Del. 1927); but see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (2d ed.) § 25:1) ("… "palming off" 
and "passing off" are synonymous, and are used in judicial opinions to mean 
three different things: (1) substitution of one brand of goods when another 
brand is ordered; (2) . . . the infringer intentionally meant to defraud and 
confuse buyers; and (3) . . . there is no proof of fraudulent intent, but there is 
a likelihood of confusion of buyers.") 
122 See, e.g., American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 
F.2d 3, 14, (5th Cir. 1974). 
123 CALLMANN, supra note 120. 
124 See Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 322 (1871) 
("… in all cases where rights to the exclusive use of a trade-mark are 
invaded, it is invariably held that the essence of the wrong consists in the sale 
of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another, and that it is 
only when this false representation is directly or indirectly made that the 
party who appeals to the court of equity can have relief."). 
125 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 (1995) ("The 
"passing off" held actionable at common law was frequently accomplished 
through the use of confusingly similar trade symbols, and during the 19th 
century this general principle of liability served as the genesis of the technical 
rules governing the validity and infringement of trademarks and the 
recognition of secondary meaning."). 
126 See 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ANTITRUST LAW § 3:12. 
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infringement and unfair competition claims thus often depend on 
proving likelihood of confusion between marks.127 Even the current 
judicial approach to false advertising cases bears striking similarities 
to the one taken to cases of trademark infringement.128 As 
commentators have noted, "[t]he principles involved in trademark 
cases and tradename cases are substantially identical."129 
Currently the main distinctions between unfair competition and 
trademark infringement lie in the standard of proof.130 Presuming 
that courts continue to cross trademark precedents with unfair 
competition precedents, however, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Lexmark will lower the threshold requirements for proof of standing 
substantially in both fields. 
D.  Consequences and Questions Left Open in Belmora 
Even beyond matters of territoriality and broadened unfair 
competition precedent, several unresolved questions stand in the 
way of owners seeking to claim trademark protection for foreign 
marks unused in the U.S. Taken on its face, Belmora tries to deliver 
the results of Article 6bis without encroaching on congressional 
territory; however, the decision overextends unfair competition law 
and so undercuts any precedential use.  
Belmora's reliance on unfair competition precedents to decide a 
trademark matter pled under the Lanham Act treads on thin ice. Nine 
circuits have addressed whether § 44 of the Lanham Act creates a 
                                                                                                             
127 See generally Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S. Ct. 
68, 63 L. Ed. 211 (1918). 
128 See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal 
Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1312 
(2011) ("The advertising plaintiff need not show that the defendant 
promulgated the false ad deliberately. Similarly, like the trademark plaintiff, 
the advertising plaintiff need not show any actual harm flowing from the 
advertisement, unless seeking money damages. To obtain an injunction, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate only that the defendant's ad is false and that the 
plaintiff is "likely" to be injured by the defendant's conduct."). 
129 Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of Harm, 
95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 72 (2009). 
130 See generally David L. Belt, The Standard for Determining "Unfair Acts 
or Practices" Under State Unfair Trade Practices Acts, 80 CONN. B.J. 247 
(2006); see also CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO TRADEMARK LAW § 17:11. 
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new federal right against unfair competition for foreign competitors. 
Of these, only the Ninth Circuit has held that the section grants broad 
national protection.131 The remaining courts have, for the most part, 
elected to follow the Second Circuit's holding that §§ 44(b), (h), and 
(i) only extend to citizens and residents the same benefits that any 
convention or treaty recognizes for aliens.132 To date, the Paris 
Convention remains the only treaty signed by the U.S. which has 
addressed the matter. Unfair competition law, in essence, provides 
no answers that trademark law does not: both must go through the 
Paris Convention or not at all. 
Critics have also flagged concerns on the matter of standing 
under the well-known mark doctrine going forward.133 Belmora 
aside, only one case has reached a circuit court after Lexmark. In 
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.,134 the Federal 
Circuit held that Cuban cigar company Cubatabaco had a right to 
seek the cancellation of a trademark registered in the U.S. even 
though Cubatabaco remained barred from selling products within 
the country. Looking to statutes which authorized transactions for 
registering and renewing trademarks,135 the court determined that 
Cubatabaco had a "real interest in cancelling the Registrations and a 
reasonable belief that the Registrations blocking its application 
[were] causing it damage."136 The decision's restraint struck a sharp 
contrast to Belmora, which relied on a lack of explicit statutory 
restrictions in order to expand Lexmark's application to cancellation 
and other Lanham Act remedies.137 Even presuming that courts can 
safely generalize unfair competition tenets into trademark cases, 
such decisions must be narrowly read in light of the narrow 
                                                                                                             
131 See Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950). 
132 See 1 L. ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & 
MONOPOLIES § 2:6 (4th ed.). 
133 See generally Charles Lee Thomason, After Lexmark Rejects Multifactor 
Measures for Standing, Which Challengers Stand in the Zone of Interests for 
Lanham Act Remedies?, 25 FED. CIRC. BAR. J. 699 (2016).  
134 Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
135 31 C.F.R. § 515.527. 
136 Id. at 1274. 
137 See supra Part II. 
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conditions under which those protections originated.138 
Commentators have noted the dangers of taking the well-known 
mark doctrine too far.139 By expanding standing to the wide range 
of remedies available under unfair competition law and the Lanham 
Act, and lowering the necessary burden of proof, Belmora and 
Lexmark in combination threaten to impact trademark registration 
in the U.S. and chill healthy competition significantly. 
 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HOW TO APPLY THE WELL-KNOWN 
DOCTRINE IN A POST-BELMORA WORLD 
 
As trade globalizes, so must trade-related lawsuits. Decades of 
commentary have criticized the overlap between unfair competition 
and trademark law,140 the conflicts of the well-known mark doctrine 
with essential U.S. trademark principles,141 and the complexities of 
broadened standing for trademark cases.142 By introducing a new 
loophole into the U.S.'s recognition of the Paris Convention, 
Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG brings all of these 
concerns to a crisis. In a post-Belmora world, courts can no longer 
ignore the tensions between the U.S.'s expanding application of 
unfair competition precedent and existing trademark canon.  
Two answers to this dilemma exist: first, whether a majority of 
circuits eventually elect to follow or to reject Belmora's treatment of 
foreign trademark owners, courts must rein in the capacity to file 
                                                                                                             
138 See 1 L. ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & 
MONOPOLIES § 2:6 (4th Ed.) ("…if a liberal interpretation of § 44 were 
adopted, Section 1338(b) of the Judicial Code would then appear superfluous, 
except . . . in cases of pending claims arising from transactions not affecting 
interstate commerce.").  
139 See Lee Ann Lockridge, Honoring International Obligations in U.S. 
Trademark Law: How the Lanham Act Protects Well-Known Foreign Marks 
(and Why the Second Circuit Was Wrong), 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1347 (2010). 
140 Jamey Minnihan, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too: U.S. Treatment of 
Well-Known Foreign Trademarks and Its Global Market Implications, 50 
GONZ. L. REV. 219 (2015). 
141 Katherine-Anne Pantazis Schroeder, A Trademark Gamble: Should Use of 
Services Abroad by U.S. Citizens Meet the Lanham Act "Use in Commerce" 
Requirement?, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1615 (2005). 
142 Kristin Zobel, The Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should Well-Known 
Foreign Marks Receive Trademark Protection Within the United States?, 19 
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 145 (2008). 
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claims and cancellation proceedings against U.S.-registered 
trademarks based on the priority dates of foreign registrations. 
Because the U.S. lacks the binding directives of the E.U. to restrict 
the remedies available to unfair competition and trademark 
claimants, U.S. courts may look to the Trademark Directive and the 
ECJ's decisions for extreme s to avoid in mixing trademark and 
unfair competition precedents. Second, legislators should reference 
the extensive writings on the well-known mark doctrine in explicitly 
delineating the intersection between the Paris Convention and the 
Lanham Act. In light of Lexmark, however, any such legislation 
should address and prioritize matters of standing for trademark suits. 
Only by distinguishing trademark claims can U.S. trademark owners 
maintain confidence in their properties. 
A.  Balancing the Well-Known Mark Doctrine in Court 
What problems the judiciary giveth, the judiciary may take 
away. Because Belmora's issues arose largely as a matter of 
statutory interpretation and judicial implementation, the case has 
potential for a quicker solution than awaiting statutory amendments 
from Congress. Courts which choose to ignore Belmora's grant of 
partial rights to foreign trademark owners will likely follow the 
Second Circuit's wholesale rejection of Article 6bis, which provides 
the same effects as Belmora and shares its lack of explicit judicial 
grounding. While ignoring the systemic faults brought to the fore in 
Belmora hardly solves them, avoidance would minimize the 
decision's key issue: undermining the territoriality principle by 
entrenching precedent where foreign trademarks could supplant 
U.S. trademark registrations without some showing of harm within 
the country. 
In the same vein, courts which accept Belmora must narrow its 
scope. Commentators have offered myriad potential 
implementations for balancing the well-known mark doctrine 
against trademark territoriality in the U.S.143 In a post-Belmora 
                                                                                                             
143 See generally James E. Darnton, The Coming of Age of the Global 
Trademark: The Effect of Trips on the Well-Known Marks Exception to the 
Principle of Territoriality, 20 MICH. ST. INT'L. L. REV. 11 (2011); Geri L. 
Haight & Philip Catanzano, The Effects of Global Priority of Trademark 
Rights, 91 MASS. L. REV. 18 (2007); Maxim Grinberg, The WIPO Joint 
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world, courts seeking to address these matters should pay particular 
attention to clarifying the boundaries of what may constitute a 'well-
known mark' and by pleading that its mark enjoys some reputation 
in a substantial portion of the relevant market sector, which is likely 
to be damaged by the registered mark's uninterrupted use. This 
would conform with both common law trademark enforcement and 
trademark dilution suits under the Lanham Act, which grants 
standing to any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to 
be damaged by such act. To this end, courts could look to the 'Joint 
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-
Known Marks',144 as the E.U. has done, in entrenching a uniform 
definition of the 'well-known mark' distinct from trademark 
dilution's 'famous mark' in the U.S. Regardless, courts should 
distinguish trademark infringement claims from unfair competition 
by restricting unfair competition claims to § 43 of the Lanham Act 
and requiring showings of actual territorial harm under trademark 
infringement. By restricting remedies to their separate fields, courts 
would avoid chilling corporate competition. 
 
1. Learning from how Other Jurisdictions have Applied Article 
6bis  
 
The E.U. has avoided quagmires like Belmora by establishing 
both resources for defining a 'well-known mark'145 and maintaining 
rigorous standards for proving trademark infringement of a foreign 
mark.146 Unregistered marks generally receive only the damages and 
injunctions necessary to make the plaintiff whole again.147 Under 
                                                                                                             
Recommendation Protecting Well-Known Marks and the Forgotten Goodwill, 
5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2005). 
144 World Intellectual Property Organization, Joint Recommendation 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well–Known Marks (Sept. 1999), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/marks/833/pub833.pdf/. 
145 While no general legislative definition exists for the 'well-known 
trademark’, trademark offices in signatory countries generally look to the 
WIPO recommendation, which has stabilized trademark protection across 
countries. See also E.U. Directive 2015/2436/EC, Art. 5(2)(d). 
146 E.U. Community Trademark Regulation (207/2009), Art. 8(2)(c). 
147 Jane C. Ginsburg, Euro-Yearnings? Moving Toward A "Substantive" 
Registration-Based Trademark Regime, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 95, 103 (2017). 
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the E.U.'s trademark regime, an inherently distinctive mark need not 
show use prior to registration; if a mark lacks that inherent 
distinction, the applicant must show that the mark has acquired 
distinctiveness through actual use for five years prior to 
registration.148 In effect, the E.U. substitutes the remedies available 
for intent-to-use applications in the U.S. with a combination of tort 
law and broad protections restricted to strong and successful marks. 
Its success derives from its presumption that any qualifying mark 
deserves broad protection. 
By contrast, U.S. trademark law qualifies protection based on 
mark use as well as registration. The Trademark Office grants bases 
for registration with a show of intent-to-use,149 and courts have 
recognized that common law trademark users deserve partial rights 
like those obtainable by registration.150 Commentators have 
criticized the disparity between types of enforceable rights, noting 
that it "undermines the utility of registration even as it honors the 
role of consumer perception in giving rise to trademark rights."151 
This disparity has another consequence: the U.S. notably lacks the 
ECJ's confinement to tort remedies, and standing in trademark cases 
does not depend on a showing that the mark has reached a 
'substantial portion of the relevant market sector'. Commentators 
have noted the U.S.'s increasing trend towards ECJ precedents in its 
battle against trademark dilution.152 Intended or not, attempts to 
                                                                                                             
148 European Union Intellectual Prop. Office, Guidelines for Examination of 
European Union Trademarks, Part B § 4, § 2.6.5 (2016) (Applicant must prove 
"a link between the sign and the goods and services for which the sign is 
applied for, establishing that the relevant class of persons, or at least a 
significant proportion thereof, identify goods as originating from a particular 
undertaking because of the trade mark."). 
149 The United States Patent and Trademark Office, Intent-to-Use (ITU) 
Applications (last visited on May 23, 2017), available at 
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/filing-online/intent-
use-itu-applications/. 
150 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); New 
England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1951); Electro 
Source, LLC v. Brandess-Kalt-Aetna Grp., Inc., 458 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2006). 
151 Jane C. Ginsburg, Euro-Yearnings? Moving Toward a "Substantive" 
Registration-Based Trademark Regime, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 95, 98 (2017). 
152 See Marcus Luepke, Taking Unfair Advantage or Diluting A Famous Mark 
- A 20/20 Perspective on the Blurred Differences Between U.S. and E.U. 
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follow the E.U.'s mix of unfair competition and trademark law in 
implementing the well-known mark doctrine could extend 
trademark cancellation rights to marks whose owners have no valid 
interests within the U.S. 
B.  Reforming the Lanham Act: Issues and Strategies 
For decades, academics have suggested a number of strategies 
for adapting the U.S.'s existing trademark law to the well-known 
mark doctrine. In large part, these suggestions remain current: 
Congress could amend § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,153 tie trademark 
rights into three separate categories of territoriality,154 or  structure 
the doctrine as a safety valve—as opposed to primary protection—
for foreign trademarks well-known in foreign jurisdictions which 
lack registration and use in the U.S.155 Few commentators, however, 
address the dangers posed by the growing blur between unfair 
competition and trademark precedent, and the threat posed by 
allowing owners outside the U.S. market to petition for trademark 
cancellations based on unfair competition claims.  
In light of the U.S.'s increasing globalization, any reform should 
bear in mind two considerations. First, a foreign mark owner 
claiming trademark infringement under the well-known mark 
doctrine should be required to plead that a substantial percentage of 
the relevant market sector is familiar with their mark, and must 
provide proof during trial in order to prevail. Second, where the U.S. 
recognizes and protects well-known trademarks based on reputation 
alone, Congress should confine those protections only to the 
relevant market sector and to the geographic areas in which the mark 
was provably used. This is in keeping with both common law 
trademark principles and with previous academic suggestions to 
                                                                                                             
Dilution Law, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 789 (2008) and Daniel R. Bereskin, Anti-
Dilution/anti-Free-Riding Laws in the United States, Canada, and the E.U.: 
Bridges Too Far?, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1710 (2011). 
153 Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don't I Know You from Somewhere? Protection in 
the United States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known but Not Used 
There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1423 (2008). 
154 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark 
Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885 (2004). 
155 Leah Chan Grinvald, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known Marks, 13 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2010). 
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maintain the doctrine as a safety valve. Unlike the E.U., the U.S. 
does not have an onerous trademark registration regime; registration 
is a small cost to pay for half a continent's worth of protection. Most 
significantly, stringent limits would protect the territoriality 
principle which defines trademark law.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG created a 
significant loophole for foreign trademark owners to bypass the 
U.S.'s existing trademark system and its current registrants. Both the 
decision, and its underlying reliance on overextended precedents, 
undermined the territoriality principle at the heart of U.S. trademark 
law. Future courts have every reason to restrain the decision's 
consequences by confining unfair competition to § 43 of the Lanham 
Act. Until Congress issues some definitive statement on the Paris 
Convention's effect, courts and agencies alike should defer to 
territoriality. In particular, owners of well-known trademarks 
seeking to enforce a registered trademark owner's traditional rights 
based on reputation alone must show both damages and a higher 
standard of proof with regard to market share and mark recognition.  
International business is increasing, and with it the need for 
stronger trademark protections. As the Trademark Office moves 
towards a registration regime less protective of marks not in use,156 
Belmora serves as a useful bellwether by which to avoid larger 
conflicts with the fundamentals of U.S. trademark canon. 
  
                                                                                                             
156 See, e.g., 82 F.R. 22517. 
34
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol12/iss4/4




● Until the courts reach a consensus, foreign trademark owners 
with significant business interests in the U.S. should not rely 
on the well-known mark doctrine, but should instead file for 
a U.S. trademark. 
● Trademark owners seeking to enforce a registration based 
outside the U.S. should distinguish between the well-known 
mark and the famous mark doctrines in pleadings. 
● Attorneys should minimize the integration of unfair 
competition case law into trademark infringement suits, and 
vice versa, except where strictly relevant to the case at hand. 
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